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Abstract
Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their
attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many cir-
cumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be
the cause of social conict, so it is very important to have a social po-
larization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper
we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has
been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure
introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It
turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone
is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of
our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we
present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income
polarization measure.
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1 Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an increasing attention towards the mea-
surement of polarization1. The main reason behind this interest is the ex-
isting connection between polarization and several social, economic or polit-
ical phenomena, specially those related to di¤erent kinds of social conict,
which can not be properly captured by the classical measures of inequality.
Unfortunately, most polarization indices have focused their attention on the
measurement of income polarizationalone, and only a few of them have at-
tempted to focus on what might be broadly referred as social polarization2.
The latter term might be coined when the factors that determine individuals
identity are socially driven and do not depend solely on their income. The
two classical examples which have been used in related papers (see previ-
ous footnote) are ethnic and religious polarization. There is great interest in
dening social polarization indices because, in many circumstances, income is
not the (only) relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conict3.
The limitations of the traditional income polarization measures become also
evident when, in particular, one explores the theoretical foundations of the
links between polarization and conict (see, for instance, Esteban and Ray
(1999)).
In the paper of Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004)  DER from now on 
there are some attempts to produce such social polarization measures
which, unfortunately, lack of any axiomatic characterization. As those au-
thors mention, the proposed measures are liberal transplants of their ndings
in the measurement of income polarization to the di¤erent contexts of Pure
Social Polarization(see equations (14) and (15)) and Hybridpolarization
measures (see equations (16) and (17)) that take into account the social group
1See Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004), Foster and Wolfson
(1992), Wolfson (1997), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Quah (1997), Wang and Tsui (2000),
Esteban, Gradín and Ray (2007), Chakravary and Majumder (2001), Zhang and Kanbur
(2001) and Rodriguez and Salas (2002).
2See, for example, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005).
3See Esteban and Ray (1999), Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Collier and
Hoe­ er (1998) or Easterly and Levine (1997) for some empirical or theoretical works that
explore the existing links between polarization and conict and other related issues.
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to which individuals belong and their corresponding income levels. However,
lacking any kind of characterization result, these indices are open to legit-
imate criticism on grounds of arbitrariness, so  the authors acknowledge 
such characterization result is an important subject of future research. One
of the main purposes of this paper is to bridge this gap by extending the ideas
presented in DER to a wider domain. We will assume that a population is
partitioned into disjoint groups according to exogenously given criteria (e.g.
religious or ethnic group) and that each individual has a given sense of iden-
tication with individuals which are similarto him. Our basic assumption
is that individuals of a given group tend to feel less alienated with the mem-
bers of the same group than with the members of other groups. We will show
how, using a modied version of the identication-alienation framework in
our multi-group context, one can obtain an axiomatically characterized nat-
ural extension of the income polarization index presented in DER.
The process of characterizing a social polarization index using extensions
of the axioms presented in DER to the multi-group case is not straight-
forward. The axioms 2, 3 and 4 used in DER admit generalizations to a
multi-group context, but axiom 1 is intrinsically single dimensional in a deep
sense we will later specify, so a completely di¤erent axiom must be intro-
duced in its place. Interestingly, it turns out that the single group version
of this new axiom can substitute axiom 1 in DER and be used to axiomat-
ically characterize the pure incomepolarization measure in a more plain,
intuitive and easily generalizable way.
Returning to the multi-group case, the characterization theorem arising
from the use of the new axioms yields another interesting result: the cor-
responding lower bound on  (which is the parameter of interest in most
polarization measures) depend on the number of groups into which a pop-
ulation is splitted and, moreover, it can approach as much as desired the
value of zero as the number of groups increases (see Theorem 1). As we will
later see, this is a revealing point which conrms the expected relationship
between the concepts of polarization and inequality. On the other hand, the
fact of having such varying bounds on  might be uncomfortable because it
is not clear at all which is the benchmark lower value of  over which a rea-
sonable social polarization measure can be said to depart from the concept
of inequality. In order to overcome these limitations, another axiom that
further restricts the class of admissible indices must be imposed (see Theo-
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rem 2). These important results emphasize that, when extending the income
polarization index presented in DER to a broader multi-group context, the
axioms used in that paper are not enough, so additional axioms are required.
In section 2 we will introduce the basic notations used throughout the pa-
per and present the axioms that will be used to characterize our polarization
index. In section 3 we show the limitations of using the axioms presented
in DER alone when characterizing a social polarization index. Then, we in-
troduce an additional axiom that completes our characterization result. The
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Basic notation, assumptions and the ax-
ioms.
We will make use of the identication-alienation (IA) framework introduced
in Esteban and Ray (1994) and used also in DER but adapted to a multi-
group context. From now on, we will consider N  2 population groups
which are exogenously given, each of which with a population mass Mi > 0
and a population share i 2 (0; 1). These groups are supposed to be relevant
in dening individualssense of identity. We will assume that to each indi-
vidual we can attach a radicalism degree x( 0) which can be thought as the
intensity with which he/she feels to belong to his/her particular population
group. This way, we want our measure to be sensitive to the degree to which
individuals feel involved with their own group (and not only to the mere fact
of belonging or not belonging to a particular group4), as this might greatly
inuence the polarization levels in a given society. For each population group
we will have an unnormalized density function fi(x) that measures the way
in which the radicalism degree is distributed therein. We are assuming that
the support of each fi(x) is R+. Hence
1R
0
fi(x) = Mi and, if we denote the
total population by M , then M =
NP
i=1
Mi and Mi=M = i. From now, the
4This is the approach used in the discrete polarization measure presented in DER
(equation (14)), or in the Reynal-Querol Index (see Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005)).
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density functions for the whole population will be thought a collection of N
unnormalized density functions (one for each population subgroup), that is
fN : RN+ ! RN+ where fN(x1; : : : ; xN) = (f1(x1); : : : ; fN(xN)). When no con-
fusion arises, fN will be simply written as f . The population shares vector
associated to f will be denoted by  = (1; : : : ; N).
When adapting the IA framework to our multi-group context, di¤erent
more or less reasonable alternatives are feasible: in this paper we will focus
on what we think is the most natural of them. Firstly, we assume that an
individual belonging to the population group i and with a radicalism degree
of x experiences a sense of identication that depends on fi(x)5. Concerning
alienation, we assume that two individuals belonging to the same population
group with radicalism degrees of x; y  0 (x 6= y) feel alienated, and that
this alienation is monotonic in jx   yj. From the other side, two individ-
uals belonging to di¤erent groups with radicalism degrees of x; y  0 are
also assumed to feel alienated, the latter being monotonic in x + y. Under
these assumptions, we are implicitly asserting that individuals belonging to
di¤erent groups always feel alienated against each other unless x = y = 0 (in
other words: the groups are truly relevant for individualsidentity feeling)
and that, ceteris paribus, individuals of a given group tend to feel less alien-
ated with respect to the members of the same group than with the members
of the other groups, which in many cases seems to be a reasonable assump-
tion6. Using the same notation as in Esteban and Ray (1994) and DER,
we measure e¤ective antagonism by means of a nonnegative funtion T (i; a),
where it is assumed that T is continuous, increasing in its second argument
and T (i; 0) = T (0; a) = 0. In those papers, it was assumed that polariza-
tion can be dened as the sum of all e¤ective antagonisms. Adapting this
5Of course, alternative hypothesis could have been presented. The most simple one
would have been to assume that all individuals of a given population group are equally
identied between themselves, so that individuals sense of identication would depend
only on Mi. It is not di¢ cult to prove that this and other assumptions, together with the
suitably chosen axioms, would lead to a Pure Social Polarizationmeasure as the one
presented in DER, equation (14). However, for the sake of concreteness, this issue will not
be pursued here.
6Recall that these assumptions would not make sense in a (multi-group) context of
income polarization (see, for instance, equation (17) in DER). In that case, one would
have that two individuals with respective incomes x; y belonging to di¤erent population
groups but with x = y would not feel alienated vis-à-vis each other, whereas in our social
polarization context, this would not be the case.
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reasonable assumption to our multi-group context, social polarization can be
dened as
PN(f) :=
NP
k=1
NP
l=1
Z Z
T (i(x); a(x; y))fk(x)fl(y)dydx: (1)
Under the aforementioned identication-alienation assumptions, equation
(1) can be rewritten as
NP
k=1
Z Z
T (fk(x); jx yj)fk(x)fk(y)dydx+
NP
k=1
P
l 6=k
Z Z
T (fk(x); x+y)fk(x)fl(y)dydx;
(2)
Clearly, when N = 1; one has that 1 = 1 and PN(f) reduces to the
classical polarization index dened for a single population in DER. One of the
main purposes of this paper is to present some reasonable axioms under which
PN(f) can be written downmore explicitly, so that equation (2) becomes more
operational.
2.1 The axioms
In order to present our axioms, we will use the notions of basic densities, roots
and -squeezes presented in DER. Here, we will only present the denitions;
for more details and discussion the interested reader is referred to that paper.
A basic density is a density function which is unnormalized by population
size, symmetric, unimodal, with compact and connected support. A root is
a basic density with mean 1 and support [0; 2] with population size set to
unity. Given any basic density g with mean  and  2 (0; 1], a -squeeze of
g is dened as the mean-preserving transformation
g(x) := 1

g

x (1 )


:
Moreover, we will need to introduce the following sets. Dene N :=
f(1; : : : ; N) 2 RN+ j
P
i i = 1g the standard simplex in RN and
B := f(1; : : : ; N) 2 N ji = j = 12 for some i 6= j 2 f1; : : : ; Ngg:
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The set B contains the population shares in which only two popula-
tion groups have (the same) positive mass, that is: it contains the equally
weighted bipolar distributions. Now, we will dene the set of population
shares which are arbitrarily close to any of the two equal sized group share
distributions:
B() := f 2 N jk   ek <  for some e 2 Bg
for some  > 0, k:k being the Euclidean norm. Finally, we will dene
S := f(1; : : : ; N) 2 N ji = 1 for some i 2 f1; : : : ; Ngg:
The set S contains the population shares in which there is a single pop-
ulation group. Analogously, we can dene the set
S() := f 2 N jk   ek <  for some e 2 Sg;
which contains the population shares which are arbitrarily close to any
single population distribution. Recall that in this paper we are not interested
in considering those cases in which only a single group has a positive mass,
since then we would be exactly in the same context as in DER: the cases at
stake here are the ones in which at least two population groups have positive
mass. Hence, even if we are not interested in the congurations for which
the corresponding population shares belong to S, those belonging to S()nS
will be included in our domain.
In order to axiomatically characterize our polarization measure, whenever
possible we propose natural extensions to our multi-group context of the
axioms presented in DER (compare axioms 2, 3 and 4 below with their
analogues in DER). However, when it comes to generalize axiom 1 in DER
to the multi-group context, an important limitation arises. It turns out that,
if one introduces more population groups, the corresponding axiom is not
straightforwardly satised, so it must be formulated in a careful way that
makes it loose its intuitive force7. For this reason, our rst axiom will be
completely di¤erent, having no analogue in the DER axiomatization.
7The most natural candidate to extend axiom 1 in DER to the multi-group context
would read as follows: Axiom 1: Consider a distribution in which each population
group has the same normalized density function fi(x) composed of a single basic density.
Suppose that some population group concentrate an arbitrarily large proportion of the whole
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Axiom 1. Consider a distribution in which each population group has the
same normalized density function fi(x) composed of a single basic density.
Suppose that some couple of population groups have the same population share
and concentrate an arbitrarily large proportion of the whole population mass
(that is:  2 B() for any arbitrarily small  > 0). Then, if we shift mass
from one of the big groups to the other, polarization should decrease.
This axiom captures the intuitive idea that the equally weighted bipolar
distributions maximize polarization. It is important to point out that the
single group version of this axiom8 would serve the same purpose as axiom
1 in DER, that is: it would (upper) bound the values of  to 1. In particu-
lar, this implies that the polarization measure presented in DER could also
be axiomatically characterized substituting their single-squeeze axiomby
the single group version of our new axiom (see proof of Lemma 2 in the ap-
pendix). We contend that this alternative way of characterizing the income
polarization measure is preferable on two grounds: rst, it is even more plain
and intuitive9 and second, it allows for a straightforward generalization to
the multi-group case. Clearly, it is preferable to characterize a measure with
axioms that can be easily extended to broader contexts than with dimension-
specic ones. From the other side, it is reassuring that both axioms yield
almost the same restriction on the bounds of  (see later).
Axiom 2. Consider a symmetric distribution in which each population
group has the same density function fi(x) composed of two basic densities
with disjoint support sharing the same root. Then, if all outer distributions
population mass (that is:  2 S()nS for some arbitrarily small  > 0). Then, if we
squeeze the density of the large group, polarization should decrease.However, it can be
veried that axiom 1holds only when the size of the small groups and the extent to which
the bigger group density is squeezed (measured by  2 (0; 1]) are related in a certain way.
When a certain value of  is xed, one can nd su¢ ciently small (but depending on )
population masses for the other groups making axiom 1hold true. Since this might not
be intuitively compelling, it has not been included as a characterizing axiom.
8Clearly, the single group version would be: Axiom 1: Consider a distribution
composed of the same two basic densities, with the same population mass and disjoint
supports. Then, if we shift mass from one group to the other, polarization must decrease.
9Recall that the single-squeezeaxiom introduced in DER seems quite intuitive but is
introducing some non-trivial restrictions. In particular, it states that when a basic density
is globally compressed, the e¤ect of reduced inter-individual alienation on polarization
counterbalances the e¤ect of increasing identication for the individuals located at the
center of the distribution. Stated in this way, this restriction is not particularly compelling.
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are squeezed, polarization must increase.
This axiom is a straightforward extension of axiom 2 used in DER to the
multi-group case. Its intuition is completely analogous: when the most radi-
calized individuals in each group are made more homogeneous or compact,
then polarization is expected to rise. This is the axiom that distinguishes po-
larization from inequality: recall that an inequality measure would decrease
under the transformation presented in axiom 2.
Axiom 3. Consider a distribution in which each population group has
the same normalized density function fi(x) composed of two basic densities
with disjoint support sharing the same root. Consider, moreover, that the
population shares vector  2 B() for some arbitrarily small  > 0. Slide
the inner basic densities outwards, while keeping supports disjoint. Then
polarization must increase.
This axiom is a plain and intuitive generalization of axiom 3 used in
DER. It tries to capture the idea that if the di¤erent groups are made more
homogeneous, then polarization should increase. After this transformation,
individuals feel less alienated with respect to the members of the same group
but more alienated with respect to the others. A couple of remarks are
in order at this point. First, recall that this axiom captures the idea that
alienation between individuals of the same group is less important than alien-
ation between individuals of di¤erent groups, which we consider a reasonable
assumption. Second: in order to ensure that the axiom makes sense, the pop-
ulation shares are imposed to be arbitrarily close to any of the equal-sized
two groups shares. If no restriction were imposed on the population shares
distribution, the axiom could make no sense at all: imagine, for example,
a distribution in which a single population concentrates the most part of
the mass and that the other (N   1) groups had a negligible mass. In that
case, an outward slide transformation as proposed in axiom 3 would decrease
polarization rather than increasing it because of the negligible e¤ect of very
small groups on the nal result.
Axiom 4. If PN(f)  PN(g) and p > 0 then PN(pf)  PN(pg); where
pf and pg represent population scalings of f and g respectively.
This population invariance axiom is very common in the literature of
polarization or inequality measurement. It states that if polarization is higher
9
in one situation than in another, it must continue to be so when populations
in both situations are scaled up or down by the same amount.
3 Statement of the main results and some re-
marks.
We will start with the following characterization result.
Theorem 1 A polarization measure as dened in (2) satises axioms 1,2,3,4
if and only if it is proportional to
PN;(f) =
NP
i=1
Z Z
f 1+i (x)fi(y)jx yjdydx+
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Z Z
f 1+i (x)fj(y)(x+y)dydx;
(3)
where  2 [ 1
3N 2 ; 1): In particular, when N = 2,  can reach the admis-
sible value of 1.
According to Theorem 1, the lower bound of  is strictly positive and
depends on the number of groups we are taking into account10 in such a way
that, as those increase, the lower bound increasingly approaches the value
of 0. As is well known, the value of  has to be treated as the degree of
polarization sensitivity (see Esteban and Ray (1994)) and the larger is its
value, the greater is the departure from inequality measurement. The fact
that the lower bound of  can approach 0 as much as desired by considering
a large number of groups is somewhat uncomfortable, but, as we will now
see, this is a natural result that conrms the expected relationship between
the concepts of polarization and inequality. Keeping other things equal, an
increase of the number of groups leads to a decrease in individuals sense
of identication, as there are fewer individuals in each group. Pushing this
argument to its limits, one would end up with a population in which the
identication component would be the same for all individuals (that is: it
10Recall that the bounds for  found in Theorem 1 coincide with those proposed in DER
only when the number of groups is two.
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would be irrelevant) and the only relevant contribution to polarization would
come from the alienation component. Recall that when the identication
component plays no role in the IA framework, we are back to the conceptual
foundations of inequality. Hence, it should not be surprising that, in those
extreme cases,  is allowed to approach the value of 0.
Be that as it may, it must be acknowledged that the fact of having vary-
ing admissible lower bounds for  is uncomfortable to a considerable extent,
because it is not clear at all which is the benchmark lower value of  over
which a reasonable social polarization measure can be said to depart from the
concept of inequality. Moreover, the analysis of sensitivity of social polariza-
tion to di¤erent values of  (equivalent to the empirical analysis presented
in DER, section 3.2) is conceptually awed if we pretend to compare popula-
tions which are splitted into di¤erent number of groups, as the corresponding
ranges of admissible values of  will not coincide. One possible way of avoid-
ing these problems is to impose the following reasonable axiom.
Axiom 5. For any population of xed mass M consider symmetric con-
gurations in which all density functions fi(:) are the same basic density.
Then, PN1(fN1)  PN2(fN2) for any N1  N2  2:
This axiom captures the widespread idea that, other things being equal,
the larger the number of groups, the lower the corresponding polarization11.
Some authors have used this idea or very similar ones in the study of conict
and polarization (see, for example, Esteban and Ray (1994,1999) or Mon-
talvo and Reynol-Queral (2005), who trace this idea from the seminal works
of Horowitz (1985)). It is important to recall that this axiom would not
make sense if our purpose were to measure bipolarization, as is the case,
for example, of the Wolfson Index (see Wolfson (1994)). Imposing this mild
restriction, one obtains the following theorem.
Theorem 2 A polarization measure as dened in equation (2) satises ax-
ioms 1-5 if and only if it is of the form presented in equation (3) with the
additional restriction that   1=2:
11Recall that axiom 5 cannot be faithfully translated to the single group context used
in DER because of the way in which the corresponding domains have been dened. In the
multi-group case, all group densities are at the same distance between them whereas in
the single group case this cannot happen by construction.
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This way, we are ruling out the uncomfortable dependecy of the range
of admissible values of  on the values of N . With the inclusion of axiom
5, the new bounds of  make clear which is the range of values for which a
reasonable polarization measure is obtained. Theorems 1 and 2 make clear
that when passing from the single group to the multi-group context, the
axioms used to characterize the polarization index presented in DER are not
enough and that further restrictions must be imposed. We contend that,
in some instances, the social polarization index presented in this paper can
be better suited than its pure income counterpart to explore, either from
a theoretical or an empirical point of view, the intertwined relationships
between polarization and social conict.
4 Appendix: Proof of the theorems.
4.1 Proof of theorem 1.
The proof of theorem 1 is lengthy and technically involved. However, its
structure is analogous to the proof of the main characterization theorem
presented in DER (theorem 1). Firstly one must establish that axioms 1-
4 imply (3). Then, in proving the su¢ ciency part, one can establish the
bounds for . Since the underlying ideas in each of the di¤erent steps are
similar and there are only some technical di¤erences, the proof will not be
shown here, but is available upon request. The only part of the proof we
will reproduce here is the one concerning the use of axiom 1(which is the
only one which is conceptually di¤erent from its single group counterpart
shown in DER). In Lemma 1 we establish the upper bound of . Moreover,
in the proof of Lemma 1 we show that the characterization of the income
polarization measure presented in DER can be improved by using the single
group version of axiom 1.
Lemma 1. Given that PN;(f) is of the form (3), axiom 1 is satised if
and only if  < 1 for N > 2 and   1 for N = 2:
Proof : Consider a conguration as given in axiom 1. Without loss of
generality, we will assume that the whole population mass (M) is normalized
at 1. Moreover, we assume that the rst two population groups are the ones
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concentrating an arbitrarily large proportion of the whole population mass,
so 1 = 2 =  and  can be arbitrarily close to (and smaller than) 1=2.
Each (normalized) fi(x) is the same basic density with mean  on support
[a; b] and root f . Letm =  a and let d be the distance between the means
of two basic densities. By symmetry, one has that d = 2(m+ a). According
to equation (3), and using lemmas 6 and 7 in DER, total polarization in this
context is equal to
PN;(f) = (4km
1  1(f
; ))
NP
i=1
2+i + (2kdm
  2(f
; ))
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
1+i j:
Since we want to control for the e¤ects of a transfer of population mass
() from one of the big groups to the other, we will rewrite the last expression
as
PN;(f ;) = (4km
1  1(f
; ))

( +)2+ + (  )2+ +
NP
i>2
2+i

+
2kdm  2(f
; )[( +)1+ (  ) + (  )1+ ( +)+ 
( +)1+ + (  )1+ NP
i>2
i + 2
NP
i>2
1+i + C]; (4)
where C includes terms not depending on . Now, according to axiom
1, PN;(f ;) should have a maximum at  = 0. Hence, we need to compute
the rst and second derivatives of PN;(f ;) with respect to . Computing
@PN;(f ;)
@
we obtain
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )
 
( +)1+   (  )1++
2kdm  2(f
; )[(  )1+   ( +)1+ + (1 + )
(2  2)  (  )1    ( +)1 + (( +)   (  )) NP
i>2
i

]:
Clearly, @PN;(f ;=0)
@
= 0, so  = 0 is a critical point of PN;(f ;). Now,
@2PN;(f ;)
@2
is equal to
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )(1 + ) (( +) + (  ))+
2kdm  2(f
; )(1 + )
[(( +) 1(  ) + (  ) 1( +))  2 (( +) + (  ))+
(( +) 1 + (  ) 1)
NP
i>2
i]:
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Hence, one has that @
2PN;(f ;=0)
@2
is equal to
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )(1 + )2+
2kdm  2(f
; )(1 + )[2   4 + (1  2)2 1]
since
NP
i>2
i = 1  2. Inspecting the last expression, we see that the rst
term is always positive and that the second one can be negative. Hence,
and given the fact that d = 2(m + a) (so one has that 2kdm  2(f
; ) =
4km1  2(f
; ) + 4kam  2(f
; )), a necessary and su¢ cient test case to
test whether @
2PN;(f ;=0)
@2
 0 is to impose that a = 0: Moreover, by lemma
10 in DER, one has that, for any  > 0;  2(f
; ) =   1(f
; ) for some
   3: In that case, after some computations we can rewrite @2PN;(f ;=0)
@2
as
4km1  1(f
; )(1 + )2 1 [(2 + )(1   ) +  ] :
Finally, we have to check which are the values of  for which some   1=2
can be found such that [(2 + )(1   ) +  ]  0: If the last restriction
must hold true, one must have that
  2(  1)
 +   ;
Now, since 2(    1)=(  +     ) is an increasing function in   when
 > 0 and    3, from the last expression we deduce that
  4
3 2 :
According to the conguration stated in axiom 1,  2 B(), so one must
have that 1=2    <  for some arbitrarily small . Using this fact, if one
inspects the last bound on  one deduces that   1 when  = 1=2 (in which
case there are only two groups with positive mass (N = 2)) and that  < 1
when 1=2   <  < 1=2. This proves the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Recall that the income polarization measure presented in DER can be
axiomatically characterized substituting the single-squeeze axiomby the
single group version of axiom 1 (see footnote 10). In order to do so, it su¢ ces
to follow an analogous argument as in Lemma 1 but working only with two
population groups (N = 2) and setting  = 1=2:
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4.2 Proof of theorem 2.
According to theorem 1, a polarization index as dened in (2) is proportional
to PN;(f) if and only if axioms 1 to 4 are satised. Let us now check what
happens when axiom 5 is imposed. Without loss of generality, we will assume
that the whole population mass (M) is normalized at 1 so, by symmetry,
the population shares i will be equal to 1=N . Total polarization can be
decomposed as
PN;(f) = NP
w +N(N   1)P b;
where Pw is the internal polarization within groups and P b is the polar-
ization between groups. Now, if we use lemma 6 (DER) with  = 1 we have
that
Pw = 4k
 
1
N
2+
m1  1(f
; )
where k is a positive constant, m is the distance between the mean and
the lower tail of the basic density. From the other side, using lemma 7 (DER)
with  = 1 we obtain
P b = 2k(2)
 
1
N
2+
m  2(f
; );
where  is the mean of the basic density. Recall that, by denition,
m  : Substituting the last two expressions into PN;(f) we obtain
PN;(f) = 4km
    1
N
1+
(m 1(f
; ) + (N   1) 2(f ; ));
If axiom 5 has to be satised, one must have that @PN;(f)
@N
 0: Di¤eren-
tiating the last expression with respect to N , we obtain
 (1 + )   1
N
2+
(m 1(f
; ) + (N   1) 2(f ; )) +
 
1
N
1+
 2(f
; );
where we have dropped the constant term 4km . Rearranging the last
expression, one obtains
@PN;(f)
@N
   1
N
2+
[(1 + )( m 1(f ; ) +  2(f ; ))  N 2(f ; )] :
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Observe that the term ( m 1(f ; ) +  2(f ; )) must be positive, be-
cause m   and, (by lemma 8 (DER))  2(f ; ) =   1(f ; ) for some
   3. Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient test case to prove the theorem is to
consider the lowest possible value of N (which is 2) and the highest possible
value of m (which is ). In that case, one should impose that
(1 + )( 2(f
; )   1(f ; ))  2 2(f ; )  0:
Manipulating a little bit, we see that this is satised when
   2(f;)  1(f;)
 2(f
;)+ 1(f;)
=   1
 +1
:
Clearly, the lowest possible value for this function when    3 is 1=2, so
the theorem is proven.
Q.E.D.
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